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Defendant/Appellant, Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet, Inc., hereinafter know n as
"Mountain Tech", submits the following in support of its appeal.
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Judge
Glenn Iwasaki presiding. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Mountain Tech to
call to the stand Sheryl Holmes as a rebuttal witness?
a. Standard of Review: abuse of discretion.
b. Supporting Authority: Green v. Louder, 426 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 2001;
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993); Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081
(UtahApp. 1998).
2. Whether the lower court abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiffs' attorney's fees in
the amount of $24,000 and in failing to award Mountain Tech attorney's fees?
a. Standard of Review: abuse of discretion.
b. Supporting Authority: Valcarce v. Fitzgerald 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998);
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988).
3. Whether the lower court's findings were adequate to support its award of attorney's
fees?
a. Standards of Review: abuse of discretion; correctness.
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b. Supporting Authority: Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998); Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998); Dixie State Bank u Bracken, 764 P.2d
985 (Utah 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This case is for the alleged breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud

arising out of a July 1996, written contract whereby Mountain Tech agreed to
manufacture and install kitchen cabinets in Seigfried Pollesche's and Sheryl Holmes'
("Plaintiffs") home at a cost of $10,066. Before trial, Mountain Tech was granted
summary judgment eliminating Plaintiffs' fraud claim. At trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on the breach of contract and warranty claims.
During trial of this matter, Mountain Tech attempted to recall Plaintiff Sheryl
Holmes as a rebuttal witness. The trial court refused to allow her to be recalled.
Mountain Tech appeals this decision.
After trial, both parties submitted applications for attorney's fees. Plaintiffs'
counsel requested $27,738.44 in attorney's fees and non-taxable costs. The trial court
awarded Plaintiffs $24,000.00 in attorney's fees and non-taxable costs. Mountain Tech
also appeals this award.
II.

Course of Proceedings
In October of 1997, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Mountain Tech and

Russell Groomer, Mountain Tech's President, alleging three counts: breach of contract
and breach of warranty against Mountain Tech, and fraud against Russell Groomer
individually. Plaintiffs made a motion for summary judgment, which was denied.
5

Mountain Tech and Russell Groomer also moved for partial summary judgment with
respect to the fraud claim. This motion was granted in favor of Russell Groomer,
removing him from the case, only three weeks prior to trial. From the filing date of the
complaint until Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment was granted, both
parties conducted extensive discovery on all three claims.
The case was tried before a jury commencing on August 8, 2000, and continuing
until August 11, 2000. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs for $7,000 on the
breach of contract claim and $2,000 for the breach of warranty claim.
Following trial, and pursuant to the contract, both sides requested attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs requested a total of $27,738.44 in non-taxable costs and attorney's fees.
Counsel for Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit in support of its request for fees claiming
that all fees related to its unsuccessful prosecution of the fraud claim were not included in
its fee request. Mountain Tech's counsel objected to the request arguing that it was the
prevailing party on the fraud claim, and that Plaintiffs' counsel failed to properly allocate
its fees between claims on which it was successful and the fraud claim.
III.

Disposition by the Lower Court
The lower court entered final judgment against Mountain Tech in the amount of

$7,000 on its First Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract). On Plaintiffs' Second Claim
for Relief (Breach of Warranty), the lower court entered judgment against Mountain Tech
for $2,000. The lower court also awarded costs to Plaintiffs in the amount of $1,384.66
and attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs to Plaintiffs in the amount of $24,000, for a
total judgment against Mountain Tech in the amount of $34,384.66.
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IV.

Statement of Facts

1.

This action was commenced on October 30, 1997. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged

Mountain Tech breached its contract whereby it agreed to construct and install cabinets in
Plaintiffs' kitchen in a workmanlike manner. R. 1-9. The complaint further alleged that
Mountain Tech was in breach of warranty by constructing the cabinets with inferior
material and failing to complete the project in a workmanlike manner. For a third claim
for relief, Plaintiffs alleged fraud against Russell Groomer, the President of Mountain
Tech, seeking punitive damages of not less than $50,000. Plaintiffs alleged that Russell
Groomer knew the cabinets being constructed and installed were not of the quality and
workmanship that had been represented. Further, Plaintiffs alleged Russell Groomer
stated that he would "make things right" and that he allegedly had no intent of "making
things right." R.l-9.
2.

Mountain Tech counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiffs had failed to pay the

remaining balance due on the contract. R. 23-26.
3.

Both parties conducted extensive discovery between October 30, 1997, and July

18,2000. R. 530.
4.

On or about June 6, 1998, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The motion

was denied on September 4, 1998. R. 272.
5.

On or about November 2, 1998, Defendants Mountain Tech and Russell Groomer

moved for partial summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' fraud claim against
Russell Groomer, the President of Mountain Tech. R. 283-288.
6.

On July 17, 2000, Plaintiffs' motion for additional time to conduct discovery was

granted by the trial court. R. 528.
7

7.

On July 18, 2000, approximately three weeks before trial, Defendants Mountain

Tech and Russell Groomer's motion for partial summary judgment on the fraud claim
was granted by the trial court. R. 530.
8.

The case was tried to a jury commencing on August 8, 2000, and continuing until

August 11,2000. R.993.
9.

During the four-day trial, Seigfried Pollesche testified first for the Plaintiffs. R.

993, T. 10. Plaintiff Sheryl Holmes was then called to the stand. R. 994, T. 188. On
direct examination, Ms. Holmes testified that she looked at a cabinet display at Mountain
Tech's showroom before signing the contract and before she went to the display for her
deposition. R. 994, T. 191-92. On cross examination, counsel for Mountain Tech
attempted to flesh-out Ms. Holmes' testimony regarding what she saw at the showroom.
R. 994, T. 215-18. At one point, it was noted that Ms. Holmes' deposition was taken at
Mountain Tech's showroom. R. 994, T. 232. Mountain Tech's counsel then asked Ms.
Holmes if she recalled him asking her at the deposition to compare and contrast the
cabinets in the display to the cabinets that were installed in her home. Ms. Holmes
responded affirmatively. R. 994, T. 233. Ms. Holmes was then asked if the display
"represents the same white type quality materials as the cabinets that were installed in
your home?" R. 994, T. 233-34. Ms. Holmes' counsel then objected on foundation and
speculation. R. 994, T. 234. The lower court initially overruled the objection but then
sustained it after a sidebar was held off the record. R. 994, T. 234. Counsel for Mountain
Tech was forced to move on to other matters. At no time, during either direct or cross
examination, did Ms. Holmes testify about damages or what she believed it would cost to
repair or replace the cabinets. R. 994, T. 188-244.
8

10.

After Ms. Holmes, the Plaintiffs called Sam Holmes to the stand. R. 994, T. 244.

Mr. Holmes is a general contractor with experience manufacturing and installing
cabinets. R. 994, T. 245-46. He was also involved in remodeling the Plaintiffs' home
and observed the kitchen cabinets being installed. R. 994, T. 251. He also had
"hundreds" of opportunities to look at the cabinets after they were installed, and knew the
type of materials that were used to make them. R. 994, T. 260. Mr. Holmes was
apparently both an expert witness and a fact witness. He testified that some of the
cabinets in the Plaintiffs' home were made with white melamine and some had white
melamine with a PVC or plastic banding. R. 994, T. 263-64. Mr. Holmes also testified
that it would cost $19,170 to replace the cabinets in a workmanlike manner. R. 994, T.
279.
11.

Plaintiffs' next witness was Frank Klenk. R. 995, T. 319. Mr. Klenk is a retired

carpenter with cabinetry experience. R. 995, T. 320-21. Approximately 16 months prior
to trial, he inspected the cabinets in the Plaintiffs' home. R. 995, T. 322. He testified that
it would probably cost more than $19,000 to repair the cabinets. R. 995, T. 327.
12.

After Mr. Klenk testified, Mountain Tech called several witnesses. Counsel for

Mountain Tech then attempted to re-call Ms. Holmes to the stand as a rebuttal witness.
R. 996, T. 656. The trial court refused to allow Ms. Holmes to be recalled as a rebuttal
witness. The court found that Ms. Holmes further testimony would be cumulative and
that there was a lack of foundation in that Ms. Holmes was not a carpenter and did not
have the expertise to compare what she saw in the display with what was in her home. R.
996, T. 658. No further testimony was taken.
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13.

After deliberations, the jury returned its verdict. R. 996, T. 721. The jury found

for Plaintiffs on the breach of contract claim and awarded damages of $7,000. The jury
also found for Plaintiffs on the breach of warranty claim and awarded $2,000. R. 996, T.
721.
14.

After the trial, and pursuant to an attorney's fee provision in the contract at issue,

both parties submitted applications for an award of attorney's fees. Plaintiffs arguing
they were the prevailing party; Mountain Tech arguing it prevailed on the fraud claim. R.
726-779,801-808.
15.

Mountain Tech submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiffs' request

for attorney's fees, arguing that Plaintiffs fees were not reasonable and included fees for
its unsuccessful prosecution of the fraud claim. R. 801-808.
16.

Plaintiffs responded arguing that the fee application "specifically excludes all

costs and attorney's fees associated with the fraud claim." R. 882.
17.

On October 2, 2000, by minute entry, Judge Glenn Iwasaki found that "under the

totality of the circumstances, the Plaintiffs prevailed in this action." R. 894. Judge
Iwasaki granted Plaintiffs $24,000 in non-taxable costs and attorney's fees. R. 896.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court refused to allow Mountain Tech to recall Ms. Holmes to the

stand as a rebuttal witness. Her testimony could have refuted or explained other
testimony offered by Plaintiffs. The lower court's failure to allow this rebuttal testimony
was an abuse of discretion, which prejudiced Mountain Tech.
II.

Plaintiffs made and pursued three claims against Appellants. While

Plaintiffs prevailed on two of its claims at trial, Plaintiffs lost on the fraud claim.
Plaintiffs' counsel failed to properly allocate its fees between the various claims, making
only general assertions that it had not included its fees for the fraud claim in its fee
application. Based on this failure, the trial court could not have properly allocated the
fees. Applying the judicially dictated tests for determining reasonable attorney's fees, the
trial court's award of $24,000 was an abuse of discretion.
III.

The trial court was required to enter findings of fact explaining and

supporting its award of attorney's fees. Its conclusory statements are insufficient. The
trial court was also required to award attorney's fees to Plaintiffs only for claims on
which they were successful. There is no evidence in the trial court's findings that this
was done. This failure to explain its findings and allocate fees was an abuse of discretion.
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ARGUMENT
I. The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion in Refusing to Allow Mountain Tech to
Call Sheryl Holmes to the Stand as a Rebuttal Witness.
The trial court erred in refusing to allow Ms. Holmes to testify as a rebuttal
witness. The court based this ruling on its judgment that the testimony would be
cumulative and that Ms. Holmes lacked the background or foundation to testify about the
materials used to make the cabinets. R. 996, T. 657-658. This was an abuse of
discretion, which prejudiced Mountain Tech and may have altered the outcome.
As this Court has stated, "rebuttal evidence is evidence tending to refute, modify,
explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence." Randle
v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah 1993) (citing Board of Education v. Barton, 617 P.2d
347,349 (Utah 1980)). Furthermore, "[a]s a general rule, testimony presented for the
purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is somewhat repetitive of
testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief." Id. See also Green v. Louder,
426 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, para. 23 (Utah 2001). This Court reviews challenges to the
admission of rebuttal testimony for abuse of discretion. Green v. Louder, 426 Utah Adv.
Rep. 25, para. 19 (Utah 2001).
Here, Mountain Tech's counsel wished to recall Ms. Holmes to question her
regarding her uncertainty as to whether or not the display that she allegedly saw in the
summer of 1996 was consistent with the product that was eventually installed in her
home. R. 996, T. 656. Counsel for Mountain Tech also wanted to "ensure that the jury,
the trier of fact, is aware that the cabinets Ms. Holmes has in her house are constructed of
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the same material, m the cabinets, that other testimony, not hers, say existed in 1996 " R
996, T. 657. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to Ms Holmes being recalled on the basis that it
would be cumulative and lacked foundation. Plaintiffs' counsel argued that Ms Holmes
does not know what type of materials exist and that she does not "know the difference
between PVC and plywood, or anything else " R. 996, T 657
Even if Ms. Holmes' testimony would have been "somewhat repetitive of
testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief," it should have been allowed
Her further testimony, based on what she stated in deposition, could have refuted,
modified, or explained the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses Specifically, Sam Holmes'
and Frank Klenk's testimony regarding the installation, appearance, and materials used in
the cabinets.
Mountain Tech's counsel also wanted to recall Ms Holmes to the stand to
respond to some of the damaging testimony given by Mr Holmes and Mr Klenk Both
of these individuals testified that the cabinets would cost over $19,000 to repair or
replace. R. 994, T.279; R. 995 T. 327. Ms. Holmes, however, had previously sworn by
affidavit that she received a bid from Huetter Mill and Cabinet that it would cost only
$4,015.19 to correct the defective work on the cabinets. R 450 This type of evidence
was proper rebuttal since it would tend to "refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize
or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence." Randle v Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338
(Utah 1993).
The trial court's error in excluding this rebuttal evidence was prejudicial in that
had it been allowed, a different result may have been reached See Astill v Clark, 956
P.2d 1081, 1089 (Utah App. 1998) (finding that trial court's error in excluding rebuttal
13

testimony was prejudicial and remanding for a new trial). Fundamental fairness requires
that a party be allowed to introduce evidence to rebut inferences the jury can draw from
an opponent's evidence. In this case, if Ms. Holmes would have been allowed to testify,
as she had in her deposition, that the cabinets she saw at the display in 1996 were of the
same quality and materials as were eventually installed in her home. The jury may well
have found no breach of contract or warranty. Also, if she had been allowed to testify as
she had by affidavit, that the cabinets would cost only $4,015.19 to repair, the jury may
have awarded a different amount.
Because the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to allow proper
rebuttal testimony, the verdict should be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.
II. The Lower Court Abused its Discretion in Awarding Plaintiffs' Attorney's fees
in the Amount of $24,000
III.
Generally, a party is entitled to attorney fees only as provided by contract or
statute. See Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981). In the
present case, the contract at issue provided that "[i]n event payments are not made as per
contract provided herein, and in the event Seller employs an attorney for the purpose of
enforcing terms hereof, the Buyer agrees to pay all costs of any such legal proceedings."
R. 263. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56.5, which grants a reciprocal right to attorney's fees to the prevailing
party. R. 726-27.
The lower court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable
attorney's fee, and this Court will consider that determination against an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998) (quoting
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Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988)). However, an award of
attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the record. See Cabrera v. CottrelL 694
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985).
Pursuant to Dixie State Bank and its progeny, the trial court should consider the
following questions in determining a reasonable fee: 1) What legal work was actually
performed?; 2) How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter?; 3) Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates
customarily charged in the locality for similar services?; and, 4) Are there circumstances
which require consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Code of
Professional Responsibility? See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah
1988). Additionally, "Utah appellate court have 'consistently encouraged trial courts to
make findings to explain the factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an
attorney fee award." Selvage v. J J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252 (Utah App.
1996) (quoting Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 784 p.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App.
1989)).
Finally, a party seeking an award of attorney's fees must set out the time
expended for (1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees,
(2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees
and the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to
attorney fees. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992).
Utah courts have consistently held that attorney's fees should be awarded to a party only
for those claims and defenses on which it was successful. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v.
Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992) See also First General Services v. Perkins, 918
15

P.2d 480, 487 (holding that the trial court should have considered a party's successful
defense of counterclaims in addition to prosecution of its own claims.); Trayner v.
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (finding that each party was successful on one
or more points, and each was therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees for
successfully enforcing the agreement against the other).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs made three claims: breach of contract, breach of
warranty, and fraud. Extensive discovery was conducted between October 30, 1997, and
July 18, 2000, when partial summary judgment was granted in favor of Defendant Russell
Groomer on the fraud claim. R. 530. The case then went to trial approximately three
weeks later on August 8, 2000. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on their
breach of contract and warranty claims. Counsel for Plaintiffs then filed an application
for attorney fees and non-taxable costs in the amount of $27,783.44. R. 736. Plaintiffs'
counsel filed an affidavit claiming that Plaintiffs were not seeking fees associated with
the fraud claim. R. 727, 735. Appellant also filed an application for attorney fees
together with a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees.
Plaintiffs failed to allocate their time appropriately between claims on which it
was successful and claims on which it failed. A party seeking attorney fees as a
"prevailing party" must submit evidence to distinguish between those fees incurred in
connection with successful and unsuccessful claims. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 9641
P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). In the case at bar, Plaintiffs simply asserted that they were
"not seeking fees and/or costs associated with the fraud claim originally asserted against
Russell Groomer" and that their fee application "specifically excludes all costs and
attorneys' fees associated with the fraud claim." R. 735, 882. Plaintiffs' counsel states
16

that "I have deducted those fees." R. 735. Allegedly, those deductions "included onethird of the cost associated in preparing the complaint, the time spent to respond to
defendant's motions for summary judgment on the fraud claim, the time spent at the
hearings on defendants motion for summary judgment, and the time spent in preparing
jury instructions relating to the fraud claim." R. 882.
The truth of these assertions is difficult if not impossible to determine. Plaintiffs
simply made the claims and then presented the trial court with 41 pages of billing and
time records. R. 738-779. There has been no accounting or specific allocation of time
for each claim pursued by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' bald assertion that all costs and fees associated with the fraud claim
were excluded does not square with the evidence. Plaintiffs' counsel's own billing
submissions total approximately $29,000 for attorney services. R. 738-779. The request
of $27,738.44 in non-taxable costs and attorney's fees is only slightly less than the full
amount of its submitted billings. R. 726. It appears that Plaintiffs deducted very little, if
anything, for its unsuccessful prosecution of the fraud claim. The fraud claim was a
major portion of Plaintiffs' case. It remained a factor in the case until three weeks before
trial when it was finally determined in Defendant's favor on July 18, 2000, by summary
judgment. It is difficult to believe that Plaintiffs spent such a tiny portion of its overall
efforts on this claim.
There are numerous specific billings, which Plaintiffs appear to have failed to
deduct. Telephone conferences regarding the fraud claim were billed. R. 767. Time for
revising jury instructions to remove the fraud claim was also billed. R. 761. Several
hours were also billed reviewing and unsuccessfully responding to Defendant's partial
17

motion for summary judgment on the fraud claim, and preparing for and deposing Russell
Groomer. R. 744, 747. It is impossible to tell if Plaintiffs actually removed these items
from their calculation. In addition to these specific items, the general discovery and trial
preparation efforts were probably related to the fraud claim, at least in part.
Apparently, the trial court also failed to allocate the time. It simply found by
minute entry that:
after all is said and done, the plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this lawsuit.
While some arguments have been proposed to indicate that defendants prevailed
on such matters, for example, as the fraud claim, the Court is convinced that under
the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiffs prevailed in this action.

R. 894. The "totality of the circumstances" is not the correct standard for determining
awards of attorney fees. Rather, the party seeking fees must aid the court by "allocating]
its fee request according to its underlying claims.'' Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah
1998). Here, both the Plaintiffs and the trial court failed to do this. Therefore, the court
abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiffs' $24,000 in attorney's fees.

III. The Lower Court's Findings Are Inadequate to Support its Award of Attorney
Fees.
In denying Mountain Tech's application for attorney's fees and awarding
Plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees, the trial court made relatively sparse findings
by minute entry. R. 893-96. In applying the Dixie State Bank factors, the courts stated
only the following:
Turning to the factors regarding attorney's fees as set forth in Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken, the Court is of the opinion that the legal work was actually performed,
that for the most part, it was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the
matter, that the attorneys' billing rates were consistent with the rates customarily
charged in the locality for similar services, and that this was not a case that was
18

overly complicated, except for the need to respond and to compel defendants
throughout the litigation, and while the results reached were relatively minor
compared to the efforts expended, that does no mean by itself that the fees are
unreasonable; however, the court will take that aspect into consideration.
The trial court adjusted Plaintiffs' billings based on its finding that "the associates
need not be involved to the extent that they were." R. 895. The court then granted
Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and non-taxable costs of $24,000. The only mention of
Mountain Tech's request was that "some arguments have been proposed to indicate that
defendants prevailed on such matter, for example, as the fraud claim, and that plaintiffs
did not get as much as they requested, the Court is convinced that under the totality of the
circumstances, the plaintiffs prevailed in this action." R. 894.
The trial court's conclusory statements are inadequate. This is a question of law
this Court reviews for correctness. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). The
trial court's findings do not explain how the court considered each of the Dixie State
Bank factors. Nor do they explain why the court failed to allocate Plaintiffs' efforts
between successful and unsuccessful claims.
In Foote v. Clark, Mr. and Mrs. Foote brought suit against the Clarks and their
selling agent for breach of contract and fraudulent interference under a real estate
purchase agreement. See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 53-54 (Utah 1998). Without
making findings of fact regarding the particular fees billed or the quality of work done,
the trial court awarded all of the Plaintiffs requested attorney fees. The Utah Supreme
Court reversed, stating that the "trial court should also document its evaluation of the
requested fees' reasonableness through findings of fact," and that the "findings should
mirror the requesting party's allocation of fees per claims, parties, and should support any
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award issued." Id. at 55. Such findings enable the reviewing court to make an
independent review of the fee award. Finally, "whether the findings are sufficient to
support the award is a question of law reviewed for correctness." Id.
In the case of Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Associates, Selvage sued J.J. Johnson for
breach of contract in connection with the sale of Selvage's business. At trial, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Selvage. Pursuant to attorney's fees provisions in the
contracts at issue, Selvage made an application for its attorney's fees, which it claimed to
be $175,000.

The defendant contended that fees were recoverable only for the contract

claims and that the application did not allocate time among the various causes of action.
The trial court awarded $42,500, stating only that the award is based on "the amount in
dispute, the complexity of the issues presented, the hourly rates charged by the plaintiffs
attorneys and the total evidence presented at trial." Id. at 1257. Selvage argued that the
trial court did not explain how these factors acted to reduce the attorney fees awarded.
See id. at 1265.
On appeal, the court remanded stating that the trial court's "conclusory statements
do not satisfy the requirement that awards of attorney fees must be supported by adequate
findings of fact." Id. The court of appeals also rejected the defendant's argument that
findings of fact should be implied. The court stated "it is not clear that these factors were
actually considered (no details to support this belief are mentioned), nor that the result
was necessary (no clear mathematical support for the result was presented by
[defendant]" Id. at 1266. Based on this, the court remanded the matter for appropriate
findings.
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The current case is similar to Foote and Selvage. The trial court's findings seem
to simply rely on Plaintiffs' affidavit, and fail to explain why it made no award to
Mountain Tech and reduced Plaintiffs' request only slightly. Even more problematic, the
trial court made no findings with regard to the allocation of time between successful and
unsuccessful claims. It is not clear from the record whether the court even attempted to
differentiate time expended by Plaintiffs' counsel on successful and time expended on its
unsuccessful claims.
In summary, the trial court's findings do not adequately explain how the Dixie
State Bank factors were considered. They do not allocate fees between claims, and they
do not explain why Mountain Tech was not awarded its requested fees. Based on this, the
case should be remanded with instructions that the trial court make appropriate findings
and reduce Plaintiffs' award of attorney's fees to properly exclude the efforts expended
on unsuccessful claims.
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ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Mountain Tech also requests an award of it attorney's fees related to this appeal.
Contract provisions, which allow for attorney fees at tnal also include those fees incurred
on appeal. See Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 1998).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court abused its discretion in forbidding Mountain
Tech to recall Ms. Holmes as a rebuttal witness. This error constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion which requires the case be reversed and a new trial be granted.
Additionally, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Plaintiffs attorney's
fees for claims on which they were not successful. The attorney's fees issue should be
remanded to the lower court (1) with direction to reduce Plaintiffs award of attorney's
fees expended for the fraud claim, or (2) in the alternative, with direction to take
evidence on the attorney's fee issue and make the proper allocation along with
explanations for any award made. Finally, Mountain Tech requests its attorney's fees
incurred on appeal.

DATED this tW_&

~day of September 2001.
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James I. Watts
•
^Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that on this
0 *>( day of September 2001,1 caused to be mailed
by first-class mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing BREIF OF APPELLANT
MOUNTAIN TECH MILL & CABINET, INC., to the following:

Bryon J. Benevento
Snell & Wilmer, LLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM A

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
BryonJ Benevento (5254)

DATE

W/&/**

SNELL& WILMERLL.P.

FILED DISTRICT COURT

15 W South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801)257-1900
Facsimile (801)257-1800

Third Judicial District

JCT 1 2 2000
8y_JS^k
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDTCTAT. DISTRICT COURT IN 4ND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEEGFRJED POLLESCHE and SHERYL
HOLMES,
Plaintiffs,

FINAL JUDGMENT
ON THE VERDICT

vs.

Civil No. 970907680 CV

MOUNTAIN TECH MILL & CABINET,
INC.,

Honorable Glenn Iwasaki

Defendant.
This matter was tried to a jury on August 8 through 11, 2000 Based upon the Special
Verdict Form signed by the foreperson of the jury, the Court enters judgment as follows1.

On plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief (Breach of Contract), judgment in favor of

the plaintiffs and against defendant Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet, Inc in the principal amount
of $7,000;
2.

On plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief (Breach of Warranty), judgment in favor

of plaintiffs and against defendant Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet, Inc. in the principal amount
of $2,000;
Final Judgment on the Verdict @J

JD
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On defendant's Counterclaim (Breach of Contract), judgment for plaintiffs and

against defendant Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet, Inc. for no cause of action.
This Court further finds that the plaintiffs are the prevailing party in the lawsuit.
Accordingly, plaintiffs are awarded court costs as set forth in their Verified Bill of Costs in the
amount of $1,384.66, and attorneys' fees and non-taxable costs as set forth in their Application
for Fees and Non-taxable Costs in the amount of $24,000, for a total judgment against defendant
Mountain Tech Mill & Cabinet, Inc. in the amount of $34,384.66. Plaintiffs are entitled to postjudgment interest at the statutory rate until the entire amount of the judgment is paid in full.
Plaintiffs are also entitled to have this judgment augmented in the amount of costs and attorneys'
fees, if any, that plaintiffs will incur in collecting this judgment.
DATED thisygT^day of October, 2000.

A

BY THE

vr
Honorable Glenn Iwasaki ~
^^'^«/
Third Judicial District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this _j_ day of October, 2000,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT, to
the following:

James I. Watts, Esq.
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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